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ABSTRACT

The Effects of Federal, State, and Private Oil and Gas Ownerships on
County Wages in the Intermountain West

by

Benjamin A. Crabb, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2016

Major Professor: Dr. Paul M. Jakus
Department: Applied Economics

Advances in drilling technology and increasing resource prices contributed to a boom in
oil and natural gas production in the Western U.S. in the first decade of the 2000s. Following the
boom, a strain of state-level legislation emerged calling for the transfer of federal lands to the
states. A justification for the proposed transfers is the claim that state management will
responsibly increase oil and gas production levels currently held back by federal regulations and
management. However, a substantial literature indicates that dependence on mineral wealth can
be a problematic economic development strategy resulting in slower growth and other undesirable
socioeconomic outcomes. Using geological variation in oil and gas abundance in the
Intermountain West, this study examined the effects of resource abundance on county wage levels
and growth rates over the period 1990 to 2010. Areas of oil and gas abundance were further
classified by federal, state, and private surface land ownership to examine institutional ownership
effects on wage levels and growth rates.
Overall oil and gas abundance was shown to have a positive impact on wage levels and
growth rates, while institutional ownerships were found to have significantly differing effects on
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county wages. State ownership was usually associated with higher wage levels and growth rates
than federal ownership, likely due to a lengthy permitting process for drilling on federal lands.
Private ownership had insignificant effects on local wages, likely due to absentee ownership. The
results provide no evidence of a ‘curse of natural resources’ in the region and lend a modicum of
support to state land transfer bills.

(73 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

The Effects of Federal, State, and Private Oil and Gas Ownerships on
County Wages in the Intermountain West

by

Benjamin A. Crabb, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2016

Major Professor: Dr. Paul M. Jakus
Department: Applied Economics

Advances in drilling technology and resource prices contributed to a boom in oil and
natural gas production in the Western U.S. in the first decade of the 2000s. Following the boom, a
strain of state-level legislation emerged calling for the transfer of federal lands to the states. A
justification for the proposed transfers is the claim that state management will increase oil and gas
production, resulting in improved economic outcomes. However, a substantial literature indicates
that dependence on mineral wealth can be a problematic development strategy which may result
in slower economic growth and other undesirable socioeconomic outcomes. The role of
institutional and private ownerships of mineral resources has not been systematically examined in
this literature. This study helps fill the gap in the literature and contributes to the debate over
public land management choices by examining the effects of institutional ownerships associated
with areas of oil and gas abundance on county wages in the Intermountain West.
The objectives of the study were twofold. First, geological variation in oil and gas
abundance was used to examine long-term effects on county wage levels and short-term effects
on wage growth from 1990 to 2010. Second, land ownership data was used to classify areas of oil
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and gas abundance into federal (Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management), state, and
private ownership categories to test for significantly differing effects on wages across ownership
types.
Results indicate that overall oil and gas abundance had a positive impact on wage levels
and growth rates in the region, while institutional ownership categories were associated with
significantly differing wage effects. State ownership was usually associated with higher wage
levels and growth rates than federal ownership, likely due to a lengthy permitting process for
drilling on federal lands. Private ownership had insignificant effects on local wages, likely due to
absentee ownership. The results provide no evidence of a ‘curse of natural resources’ in the
region and lend a modicum of support to state land transfer bills.
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INTRODUCTION

Natural resources have long been an essential part of the local economies of the Rocky
Mountain region. In recent years a boom in oil and natural gas production has been driven by
high prices and advances in drilling technology. In the Intermountain states of Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming natural gas production increased
38% and oil production jumped 12% over the period 2000-2010 (Low et al., 2014; Fig. 1).
Following the resource boom, a strain of public lands legislation emerged in some western states
which calls for the transfer of federal lands to the states, generally excluding national parks,
national monuments, wilderness areas and military reservations (Utah, 2012; Idaho, 2013;
Wyoming, 2013; Nevada, 2013; Montana, 2013; National Association of Counties, 2013). The
American Legislative Exchange Council, an influential conservative group that drafts and shares
model state-level legislation, characterizes the objective of the land transfer bills as
“to responsibly unleash trillions of dollars of abundant resources locked up on
federally controlled lands, and with them American independence and ingenuity,
as the only solution big enough to realistically and sustainably resolve national
unemployment, deficits, debts, unfunded obligations and environmental
degradation” (American Legislative Exchange Council, 2013).
Observers have noted that the sequence of events – an oil and gas boom followed by the
introduction of land transfer bills – is not mere coincidence but can be at least partially explained
by the states’ desire to capture more revenue from oil and gas production (Mencimer, 2015;
Keiter and Ruple, 2015; Puckett 2015). If a public land transfer did occur, Stambro et al. (2014)
find that states would need to cover land management costs currently paid by the federal
government. In Utah alone these costs are estimated to be $280 million ($2013) annually. Since a
majority of revenue from the public lands in question come from mineral leasing (primarily oil,
natural gas, and coal), consistently high oil and gas prices (Stambro et al., 2014) or “a massive
increase in development” (Keiter and Ruple, 2015) would be necessary to cover land

2
management costs. While a massive increase in oil and gas production may help drive economic
growth, economists have long noted a seeming paradox of natural resource-based development:
economic dependence on natural resources tends to be negatively correlated with growth (Auty,
1993; Sachs and Warner, 1997). Moreover, dependence on concentrated ‘point’ resources such as
oil and gas may more negatively affect growth since resource rents from such operations are more
easily misallocated by institutional overseers than are the more dispersed rents from other
primary production activities such as agriculture (Auty, 2001; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian,
2003; Mehlum et al., 2006a).

Fig. 1. National real prices and aggregate Intermountain West production levels of crude oil and
natural gas relative to 2000 levels (=100). Prices reflect annual U.S. crude oil first purchase prices
and U.S. natural gas wellhead prices. Production levels are aggregated values for Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Source: U.S. Energy
Information Administration (www.eia.gov).

This paper presents an analysis of the effects of county oil and gas abundance, and the
institutional ownerships associated with these resources, on county salary and wage levels and
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growth rates in the Intermountain West. Spatial datasets delineating land ownerships and oil and
gas basins are used to measure the institutional oil and gas ownership characteristics of each
county in the Intermountain Region. To the best of my knowledge this way of measuring the
institutional influence on resource development outcomes is unique within the substantial
literature on the development effects of resource wealth. The analysis considers salary and wage
levels in 1990, 2000, 2007 and 2010, and on salary and wage growth over the time periods 19902000, 1990-2007, 1990-2010, 2000-2007 and 2000-2010. While 2007 and 2010 are only
separated by three years, both time periods are included in the analysis in order to account for any
effects of the Great Recession which began in December 2007.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two is a review of the literature on
the national and regional scale effects of resource-based development. Section three provides an
overview of the historical context and current management issues related to oil and gas
development on public lands in the western U.S. Section four describes the empirical models and
data sources, and section five is a presentation of results. Section six is a discussion of the results,
and section seven concludes with suggestions for future research.

4
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Resource effects on economic development: National scale
The effect of natural resources on economic growth has long been a subject of interest in
development economics. A series of influential empirical studies by Sachs and Warner (1995,
1997, 2001) spurred a resurgence of interest in the subject in recent decades by identifying a
phenomenon dubbed the ‘curse of natural resources.’ Using cross-country growth regressions
over the time period 1970-1990, Sachs and Warner demonstrated a robust negative correlation
between a country’s natural resource wealth and its subsequent economic growth rate. Their
growth equations have the following general form (Sachs and Warner 1997):

ln(𝑦𝑇 ⁄𝑦0 )⁄𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑦0 ) + 𝛽2 𝑅𝐷 + 𝛽3 𝑍 + 𝜀

(1)

Where 𝑦0 and 𝑦𝑇 are measures of GDP divided by the economically active population at time 0
and time T; RD is a measure of the share of primary product exports in GDP; and Z is a vector of
other economic characteristics that affect a county’s steady state income level and thus its growth
rate. Variables in Z included investment, institutional quality, global commodity price shocks, and
integration with the global economy. Alternative RD measures were tested: the share of mineral
production in initial GDP; the share of primary exports to total exports; and the log of land area
per person. They also tested decadal growth rates rather than growth over the 20 year period. In
all cases, the RD variable was found to be negatively associated with subsequent growth.
The negative relationship has been confirmed in other cross country studies (Rodriguez
and Sachs, 1999; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004) as well as across U.S. States (Papyrakis and
Gerlagh, 2007) and counties (James and Aadland, 2011). The resource curse hypothesis is
conceptually puzzling, as abundant natural wealth should drive economic growth, not restrain it.
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Why then does resource dependence seem to lead to slower growth? Most explanations for the
curse follow a crowding out logic: “Natural resources crowd out activity x. Activity x drives
growth. Therefore natural resources harm growth” (Sachs and Warner, 2001). Sachs and Warner
find a negative effect of resource dependence on manufacturing sector output and a positive effect
on the ratio of services to manufacturing output, so they identify x as traded manufacturing
activities. An explanation for this finding is that positive wealth shocks from the resource sector
contribute to increased local demand, driving price increases in the factors of production for
manufacturers. This reduces profits for manufacturers, who sell their products on international
markets, and attracts labor to high wages in the resource sector. To the extent that the
manufacturing sector has positive production externalities such as technology spillovers and
higher returns to investments in human capital (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 2000), such a
reallocation of labor adversely impacts growth and can spur a vicious cycle whereby lower
returns to human capital development in the resource sector incentivizes reduced investment in
education and locks people in low-skill, resource intensive industries (Gylfason, 2001). Adding to
resource-rich economies’ potential woes, the concentrated rents from mineral resources may act
as an inducement for rent-seeking and corruption, resulting in misallocation of rents and the
deterioration of institutional quality (Gylfason, 2001; Torvik, 2002; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004;
Boschini et al., 2007).
Crowding-out explanations for the resource curse hypothesis are supported by the
findings of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004, 2007), who provide empirical evidence that resource
dependence primarily affects growth indirectly through its negative effects on investment,
openness, schooling, and corruption. In cross-country (2004) and cross-U.S. state (2007)
regressions over the periods 1975-1996 and 1986-2000, respectively, they estimate the direct
effect of resources on these transmission channels, then estimate the share of each transmission
channel in the overall negative effect of resource dependence on growth. After controlling for
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these indirect effects, they find that resources have a positive effect on growth in the crosscountry regressions (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004), while in cross-U.S. state regressions the
negative resource effect is completely explained by the indirect effects through transmission
channels. Evidence of U.S. state-level resource curse mechanisms leads Papyrakis and Gerlagh
(2007) to conclude that the resource curse is not just a problem of countries with weak institutions
but is a potentially common threat to both developing and developed economies. Importantly,
they note that exceptions to the curse phenomenon – such as positive development outcomes in
resource-abundant Norway, Iceland, Texas, and New Mexico – indicate that there is not a
necessary causality from resource dependence to lower growth. In light of this observation, they
make a general call for “prudent economic policies and cautious planning” (2007) focused on
“preventing the occurrence of these indirect phenomena” (2004). While their findings are
empirically interesting, they do not provide a theoretical explanation for curse effects beyond
reiterating the probable crowding-out mechanisms hypothesized by Sachs and Warner.
Mehlum et al. (2006a; 2006b) provide a theoretical context and empirical results which
they conclude fully explain Sachs and Warner’s findings. They assert that the variance in growth
outcomes observed in the resource curse literature can be explained by how resource rents are
distributed via the institutional arrangement and its effect on the allocation of scarce
entrepreneurial resources, in other words, by the interaction of resource dependence and
institutional quality. They consider two institutional arrangements. In a “producer-friendly”
institutional context, rent-seeking and production are complementary activities. High bureaucratic
quality, rule of law, low corruption in government and low risk of government repudiation of
contracts contribute to a context in which rent-seeking must be for a legitimate cause, and it is
difficult to be a rent seeker unless you are also a producer. Resource based development in a
producer friendly institutional context will therefore have a positive effect on income levels. In
contrast, in a “grabber-friendly” institutional arrangement, malfunctioning bureaucracies, weak
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rule of law and corruption mean that rent-seeking and production are competing activities since
entrepreneurs can capture gains from specialization in unproductive activities such as political
influence peddling. Entrepreneurial activity is thus diverted out of production until the relative
profits of engaging in production versus grabbing behavior are equivalent.
Mehlum (2006a) empirically tests the hypothesis that resources are only a curse when
resources are grabber friendly using the same data and the same methodology as Sachs and
Warner (1997), with the addition of an interaction term between institutional quality1 and
resource dependence. They find that the resource curse is completely explained by the interaction
term, such that resources are a curse when institutions are grabber-friendly and a blessing when
institutions are producer-friendly. Their conclusion is that the quality of institutions determines
whether countries avoid the resource curse. This compelling finding sheds significant light on
Sachs and Warner’s resource curse findings, but does not explain Papyrakis and Gerlagh’s (2004,
2007) finding of significant negative associations between resource dependence and investment,
openness, schooling and corruption. That is, it leaves unanswered questions regarding the
direction of causation between measures of institutional quality, resource dependence, and
growth.
Brunnschweiller and Bulte (2008) perform an analysis of these directions of causation
using a dataset describing per capita GDP growth for 60 countries over the period 1970-2000.
Their point of departure is the potential endogeneity of the measure of resources used in the Sachs
and Warner studies, and by extension much of the resource curse literature. While Sachs and
Warner refer to the ratio of primary exports to GDP as ‘resource abundance’, Brunnschweiller
and Bulte (2008, p. 249) observe that

1

The institutional quality variable is an unweighted average of five indexes: a rule of law
index, a bureaucratic quality index, a corruption in government index, a risk of expropriation
index, and a government repudiation of contracts index. See Knack and Keefer (1995).
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“this ratio is more appropriately thought of as a measure of dependence (or intensity)
than as a measure of abundance. The denominator explicitly measures the magnitude
of other activities in the economy. Consequently, the scaling exercise—dividing by
the size of the economy—implies that the ratio variable is not independent of
economic policies and the institutions that produce them.”

To account for this likely endogeneity, they instrument for resource dependence as follows:

𝑅𝐷 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝐴 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑉 + 𝛽4 𝐼 + 𝜖

(2)

Where RD measures resource dependence as the share of primary exports in GDP; X is a set of
conditioning variables including openness and regional dummies; RA is an exogenous measure of
resource abundance such as the log of total mineral resources; and CV and I are two variables
which measure different aspects of a country’s institutional context. CV provides a measure of a
country’s ‘deep and durable’ institutional characteristics; in Eq (2) it is represented by dummy
variables indicating the presence of a presidential regime or of majoritarian electoral rules (as
opposed to parliamentarian regimes and proportional representation). The justification for these
variables is that incumbent decision-makers in countries with presidential regimes and
majoritarian electoral rules (as opposed to parliamentarian regimes and proportional
representation) are not dependent on a stable majority among the legislators and are therefore
more likely cater to the needs of special interests (Glaeser et al., 2004). I measures characteristics
of institutional quality which are in a greater state of flux, such as rule of law or bureaucratic
efficacy. Their results point to presidential regimes and poor institutional quality as causal factors
of resource dependence, not the other way around, contradicting Papyrakis and Gerlagh’s
findings: “we find that countries with certain institutional designs may fail to industrialize – and
failing to develop significant non-resource sectors may make them dependent on primary sector
extraction.”
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Noting that measures of institutional quality may also suffer from endogeneity in growth
regressions to the extent that they reflect policy outcomes that are in a state of flux,
Brunnschweiller and Bulte estimate an instrument for it using the following equation which also
allows them to assess its relationship with resource abundance:

𝐼 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑋 + 𝛼2 𝑅𝐴 + 𝜖

(3)

Where I is the institutional quality variable from Eq (2), rule of law or government effectiveness;
X is a set of conditioning variables including distance from the equator and regional dummy
variables; and RA is the exogenous resource abundance measure from Eq (2). They find that
resource abundance has a positive effect on institutional quality, again contradicting common
curse findings. A plausible mechanism for this finding is that resource booms have a positive
effect on the wages of civil servants, which may reduce their willingness to take bribes and/or
improves morale (Mookherjee, 1997; Chand and Moene, 1999).
Finally, Brunnschweiller and Bulte use the instruments estimated in Eqs (2) and (3) to
specify a growth regression using exogenous measures of resource dependence, institutional
quality, and resource abundance:

𝐺 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1 𝑅𝐷 + 𝑐2 𝐼 + 𝑐3 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑐4 𝑋 + 𝜖

(4)

Where G is growth in per capita income over the period 1970-2000; RD and I are instruments
estimated in Eqs (2) and (3); RA is exogenous resource abundance; and X is a set of conditioning
variables. In this specification, they find resource abundance and institutional quality have
positive and significant effects on income growth while the exogenous resource dependence
variable has a negative but insignificant effect. Since institutional quality appeared to be the
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underlying mechanism causing slow growth, they conclude that a curse attributable directly to
natural resources may not exist.
A final concern regarding the estimation of resource-based development welfare effects
regards the time period analyzed. Several authors have expressed concern about using growth
rates measured over relatively short time spans of 20 or 30 years as the dependent variable in
econometric models of resource effects (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; Davis, 2011). Since resource
production inherently involves intertemporal tradeoffs, measuring welfare in terms of rates of
growth may be problematic. Moreover, due to the mean-reverting nature of mineral extraction, a
high current value is likely to be lower in future periods, and vice-versa. Failing to control for the
rate of growth in the resource sector would therefore produce biased parameter estimates on the
resource variable. Davis (2011) provides empirical evidence supporting this view. He adds the
change in mineral sales per worker from 1971-1990 to Sachs and Warner’s growth regressions
and finds that the curse can be largely explained by a slow-growing resource sector, a
phenomenon he calls a resource ‘drag’. Although he cannot rule out that crowding out also
occurs, he concludes that the presence of the curse is primarily driven by when variables are
measured.
Alexeev and Conrad (2009) take a different approach by focusing on the long term
impact of resources on income levels, not growth rates. This way of measuring GDP captures the
influence of the entire arc of resource discovery, extraction, and depletion on measures of
economic welfare. Since high GDP levels imply high growth at some point, they posit that using
levels rather than growth rates as the dependent variable in regression equations provides a more
accurate indication of the overall effect of resources on income. Noting the endogeneity concerns
associated with using a ratio measure of resource dependence, they measure resources as the log
of a country’s hydrocarbon deposits per capita. They find that when per capita GDP levels are
regressed on this exogenous measure of resource abundance and geographic, ethnic
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fractionalization, and institutional quality controls, the coefficient on the resource wealth
variables are positive and significant: a resource blessing. These results hold when the ratio of oil
output to GDP (as preferred by Sachs and Warner) is used in place of the per capita resource
wealth measures preferred by Alexeev and Conrad.

2.2 Resource effects on economic development: Regional scale
While much of the resource curse literature has focused on national-scale effects, several
studies have assessed regional resource effects across the sub-national units of a single country
such as U.S. states and counties. This section provides an overview of this literature including
several studies which examined the effects of oil and gas resources on economic outcomes in the
western U.S.
James and Aadland (2011) use an approach directly analogous to Sachs and Warner’s seminal
curse studies on a nationwide sample of counties to show that resource dependent counties grow
more slowly than other counties. They test the effect of county resource dependence, measured as
the share of earnings in the agriculture and mining sectors, on annual growth in per capita
personal income over 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 year time periods beginning in 1980, the first year for
which they had consistently available data. They find the curse to be present in all time periods
after controlling for state-specific fixed effects, racial homogeneity, demography, population
density, educational attainment, and spatial correlation. However, the curse effect tended to
dissipate over longer time horizons, partly because the resource dependence of counties that were
heavily resource-dependent at the first time step did not increase at an increasing rate over later
time steps. This suggests a potential resource drag (Davis 2011) may be an underlying causal
mechanism. They note there is a reduced need to control for differences in institutions, spoken
language, currencies, and corruption at the county level, and suggest that future research examine
counties that have avoided the ‘curse.’
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In a follow up study of U.S. states, James and James (2011) find that slower per capita
income growth in mining dependent states from 1980-2000 can be mostly explained by a slow
growing mining sector. They consider a hypothetical two sector economy comprised of a mining
sector and a composite sector, which is everything other than mining. Growth in such an
economy will be the weighted average of the growth rates of the two sectors. Hence, arithmetic
insists that a relatively mining-dependent economy will grow relatively slowly when the mining
sector grows more slowly than the composite sector. Given observed annual growth rates in the
national aggregate (0.0154) and mining sectors (-0.04) from U.S. Census Bureau data, James and
James estimate that the expected coefficient on an economy’s share of overall earnings in the
mining sector would be -0.045 in an annual growth rate regression over the period 1980-2000.
Data from 49 states is then used to fit a resource curse model in which per capita income growth
is regressed on the initial share of earnings in the mining sector. Using a T-test, they show that the
negative coefficient estimated for the mining variable (-0.053) is not significantly different from
the expected value (-0.045), supporting the idea that common curse findings may be detecting a
resource drag (Davis 2011). Finally, they directly account for the rate of growth in the mining
sector in a fully specified growth regression using additional covariates from James and Aadland
(2011) and find that resource dependence was positively associated with growth.
Boyce and Emery (2011) use data from U.S. states over the time period 1970-2000 to
support a theoretical explanation for the slower growth of resource dependent economies based
on Hotelling production of an exhaustible resource stock in the absence of institutional or market
failures. Noting that a surprising omission from most curse literature is the lack of a well
specified natural resource market, they consider a theoretical small two-sector open economy
comprised of a manufacturing sector and a resource sector. They define production as a function
of labor allocation to the two sectors, where the resource sector is subject to a positive but
diminishing marginal product of labor reflecting an unspecified fixed factor of production, while
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manufacturing is a constant returns to scale industry. In this scenario, they identify three factors
that determine the net flow of labor into the resource sector and consequently the growth of per
capita income in a mixed economy relative to a non-resource economy. First, the intertemporal
tradeoff of resource extraction, the Hotelling effect, means that resource owners face an
opportunity cost associated with resource production in the international capital markets. All else
constant, this causes labor to flow out of the resource sector as the resource is depleted, resulting
in slower growth in the mixed economy. The second effect is the relative rate of technological
progress in the resource sector compared to the manufacturing sector. When technological change
in the resource sector outpaces change in the manufacturing sector, the mixed economy will grow
faster than the non-resource economy. The third effect is the real resource price level. When this
price is increasing, the resource sector grows faster; when it is falling the resource sector grows
more slowly. Finally, population growth also affects per capita incomes as resource rents are
spread more thinly.
Using this theoretical scenario, Boyce and Emery articulate several expectations
regarding resource-based development. First, as long as at least some resource rents are captured
in the resource sector, an economy currently engaged in resource production will have higher per
capita income levels than an equivalent economy with no resource production (Fig. 2). Second,
growth rates in a resource dependent economy may be slower than those in a non-resource
economy without market failures or an enigmatic curse. For example, assuming a higher rate of
technological change in the manufacturing sector and constant or declining real resource prices,
the theoretical rate of income growth will be slower in the resource sector than the manufacturing
sector. Hence, a negative correlation between growth and natural resource dependence does not
require the invocation of a “curse.” Conversely, higher rates of technological progress in the
resource sector and increasing real resource prices would contribute to higher growth rates in the
resource sector: a resource blessing.
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Boyce and Emery provide empirical evidence supporting their theoretical expectations
using panel data on U.S. states over the time period 1970-2000. In a preliminary step, they fit
curse models which show a negative correlation between the share of employment in the mineral
sector and subsequent per capita income growth rates, supporting common curse findings. Then,
drawing on their theoretical two-sector economy, they specify a growth model which includes not
only the employment share in the mineral sector but also its interactions with growth rates of
mineral sector employment, the price of minerals, and population. The interaction terms are
important because the employment share in the mineral sector scales the influence of the other
variables; as mineral sector employment approaches zero, an increase in the other variables has
less effect on the economy. They note that during the time period analyzed resource prices and
the share of employment in the mineral sector was declining, and the population was growing,
thus they expect to find higher levels of resource dependence to be associated with lower per
capita income growth rates. This indeed is precisely what their empirical models show. Finally, to
test the effect of resource dependence on income levels, they specify a level regression equation
which defines per capita income levels as a function of the employment share in the mineral
sector. As expected, the coefficient on the employment share variable is positive and significant,
showing that states engaged in natural resource production – reflected in their greater
employment shares in the mineral sector – have higher per capita income levels, all else constant.
They conclude that slow growth in resource dependent economies may simply reflect
well-functioning natural resources markets which require that the marginal profit be equalized
across time. The slower growth does not necessarily imply a curse effect such as Papyrakis and
Gerlagh (2007) posit; nor does it necessarily require institutional failures as Mehlum et al.
(2006a) suggest.
Michaels (2010) examines the long term effects of resource-based specialization in the
counties of several southern U.S. states over the period 1890-1990. He identifies a county as ‘oil
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abundant’ if it is located above at least one large oilfield which was estimated to contain at least
100 million barrels of oil before any oil was extracted. Using a panel data modeling approach, he
estimates the long term effects of this exogenous resource variable on decennially measured
levels of median and per capita income, population and employment densities, educational
attainment, and transportation infrastructure. While oil abundant counties were not significantly
different than other counties in the region in the late nineteenth century, specialization in oil
production in the early 20th century spurred a virtuous cycle of development effects in oil
abundant counties. Increased incomes attracted migrants to the region while crowding out
employment in agriculture. Higher population densities in turn contributed to improved

Fig. 2. Comparative growth rates of an economy engaged in Hotelling production of an
exhaustible resource and a non-resource economy. Boyce and Emery (2011) illustrated that a
mixed economy engaged in Hotelling production of an exhaustible resource stock with a positive
but diminishing marginal product of labor will have a higher per capita income level (𝑦̂𝑅 ) during
the period of resource extraction (until time T) than a purely manufacturing economy (𝑦̂𝑀 ) with
constant returns to scale. If there is a higher rate of technological progress in the manufacturing
sector than in the resource sector, and real resource prices are constant or declining, the growth
rate in the mixed economy will be slower than in a manufacturing economy. Adapted from:
Boyce and Emery (2011), Fig. 2.
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infrastructure and the persistence of higher levels of income and population density. Oil abundant
counties also enjoyed higher employment densities in the manufacturing sector in the decades
following oil production. He finds that the positive development effects in oil abundant counties
diminished over time, suggesting that benefits of resource wealth occur primarily during the
period of resource extraction. Michaels concludes that the curse frequently found by other
researchers did not occur in the U.S. South., and if other regions failed to develop it was likely
due to interactions between abundant local natural resources and weak local institutions.
Several studies have assessed the impact of oil and gas development in the western U.S.
Weber (2012) analyzes the effects of a natural gas boom in Colorado, Texas, and Wyoming
counties from 1999-2007 on growth rates of total employment, total wage and salary income,
median income, and the poverty rate. His primary predictor variable of interest is a boom county
dummy variable, which he defines as a county in the top quintile for the change in gas production
from 1999-2007. Weber recognizes the potential endogeneity of this variable since counties can
influence their level of gas extraction and gas companies may select areas for drilling based on
variables unobservable to the econometrician. He therefore instruments for boom county using
the percent of the county overlaying unconventional gas formations. He also drops counties above
the 90th percentile of population since they may excessively influence regression results. His
dependent variables difference growth over the boom period with growth in the pre-boom period,
1993-1999. He finds that boom counties had higher median incomes than non-boom counties, but
that the benefits were skewed toward higher incomes, as the effect of the boom on wage and
salary income was four times greater than that on median income. The effect on the poverty rate
was negative but insignificant. The effect the natural gas boom on employment was positive, but
Weber’s estimates of employment gains were much smaller than those predicted by input-output
modeling for hypothetical development of shale formations in Arkansas and Pennsylvania.
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Weber (2014) assessed the impact of natural gas production on changes in sectoral and
total employment, earnings per job, and population in the counties of Texas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and Arkansas over the period 2000-2010. Measuring resources as the change in cubic
feet of natural gas production in a county, he finds little evidence of a resource curse effect:
increased gas production was associated with increased population, increased earnings per job,
and increased overall and mining sector employment, with each additional mining job estimated
to create 1.4 additional non-mining jobs. The positive multiplier effect of mining sector jobs on
non-mining employment indicates that increased gas production did not contribute to increased
resource dependence in the region. Weber used a spatial Durbin model (Anselin 1988) to test for
spatial spillover effects of gas production on neighboring counties but found that spatial effects
were insignificant.
Finally, Haggerty et al. (2014) analyze the effects of oil and gas specialization on per
capita income growth and other socioeconomic variables in the counties of Colorado, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming over the period 1980-2011. Their resource
variables were a “boom” variable, defined as the average percent of county income from oil and
gas during 1980, 1981, and 1982; and a “duration” variable, calculated as the number of years
from 1980-2011 in which income from oil and gas exceeded the average level for all study
counties. They find a significant effect of the interaction term between boom and duration
variables on per capita income growth, with positive effects of the boom variable decreasing with
duration. This suggests that a booming resource sector can be a catalyst for growth but failing to
diversify beyond the resource sector may contribute to a reduction in long run performance.
This review of the literature on resource effects on economic development yields several
key points. First, the effect of institutions and institutional quality plays a prominent role in
determining the outcomes of resource-based development. While there is a lack of consensus
regarding whether resource wealth adversely impacts institutional quality, a near consensus exists
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that poor quality, “grabber-friendly” institutions reduce the likelihood of beneficial resourcebased development outcomes. Second, the commonly used measure of resources employed in the
literature is likely endogenous to underlying economic policies and institutions, making it a
problematic variable to use in income growth or level regressions. Third, empirical estimates of
resource effects on income growth are sensitive to the time period analyzed. Potential remedies
for this concern include controlling for the growth rate of the resource sector or using levels
rather than growth rates as the dependent variable in regression equations.
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PUBLIC LANDS AND OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST

Today’s pattern of land ownership in the western U.S. is a reflection of the region’s
cultural and economic history and its climatic and topographic characteristics. During the period
of Euro-American settlement of the west, U.S. Government policy promoted land disposal to
private ownership in order to accelerate settlement and development. Due to the aridity and
rugged topography of the region settlements were largely constrained to valley lands with arable
soils and nearby reserves of reliable water, usually in the form of mountain snowpack. Miners
and prospectors took advantage of the provisions of the General Mining Act of 1872, which
promoted the private ownership and development of mining resources, to claim ownership of
lands with proven mineral deposits (Souder and Fairfax, 1996), and railroads were granted huge
swaths of land to facilitate the development of a trans-continental transportation system to link
markets in the east and west (Gates, 1968). Conquered indigenous peoples were corralled onto
reservations comprised of lands that were of little appeal for white settlers or prospectors.
Remaining lands – often mountainous, arid, or remote – were left in the public domain and
relegated to federal ownership. Under the provisions of the General Land Ordinance of 1785,
western lands were surveyed using a rectangular grid to delineate 36-square-mile “townships”
which were further subdivided into numbered one square mile “sections.” At statehood, the
federal government granted two sections per township to each state added between 1849 and
1896 (Nevada, Colorado, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming) and four sections per township to states
added after 1896 (Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico) as state trust lands to be used to fund state K12 education systems, creating a checkerboard pattern of state land ownership that persists in the
west today. Where the allotted sections were already claimed by settlers or reserved for national
forests or Indian reservations, states could select “in lieu” lands which were generally larger
blocks of contiguous lands, often on the boundaries of national forests. States were also granted
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other ‘block’ grants for the support of other public institutions such as public universities and
state capitols (Souder and Fairfax, 1996). State trust lands are held in a legal status similar to a
private charitable trust, such that the states are required to protect the body of the trust from
diminishment while generating sustained income to support K-12 schools (Woodgerd and
McCarthy, 1982).
As noted above, the General Mining Act of 1872 encouraged private ownership of
mineral-rich lands, including hydrocarbons such as coal, oil, and natural gas. Under the law,
proof of the existence of minerals had to be provided in order to stake a claim to land ownership.
Proof of the existence of oil and gas was difficult to provide due to the expensive and timeconsuming drilling that had to be performed (Daintith, 2010, p. 209). Hence, when rumors of oil
prospecting arose, “there converged on the scene countless “professional” entrymen” (Swenson,
1968, p. 732) interested in claiming the productive lands. Since subsurface oil and gas reserves
often extend across surface ownership boundaries, drillers had an incentive to extract as much oil
and gas as possible as quickly as possible, before another party did the same. In this way limited
surface claims could effectively diminish the supply of oil and gas below large tracts of land.
Eventually concern over securing a supply of oil for the U.S. Navy, which was transitioning from
coal to oil fueling, prompted the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. This act removed
oil and gas from the minerals included in the General Mining Act, and applied to all lands
belonging to the federal government which had not been privately owned (Daintith, 2010, p. 225;
Nelson, 1982). The federal policy towards these “soft” minerals would be one of retention and
leasing, not disposition (Stevens, 1985).
With the closing of the frontier in the late 19th century, the role of the federal government
as land manager evolved from a focus on land disposal to a new mandate to manage for “multiple
use.” Under the multiple use mandate, federal managers are charged with balancing the
competing interests of preservation, resource production, grazing, and public access. Observers
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have noted that balancing such divergent interests is something of an impossible mandate which
contributes to a lack of clarity on expected federal land management decisions (Stevens, 1985).
Today, actions on federal lands require compliance with the 1970 National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), a time and resource intensive review of potential impacts on natural, cultural and
economic factors. The states of the region, with the exception of Montana, do not require an
analogous environmental review process.
Environmental regulations are not the only costs faced by producers seeking to lease land
for oil and gas production. Lessees also pay a rental fee, which is the amount of money per acre
per year to hold the lease, a bonus payment based on the potential productivity of the leased area,
and a royalty, which is a percentage of the production which the lessee must pay to the mineral
owner (Woodgerd and McCarthy, 1982). These royalties make up one of the largest sources of
non-tax income for federal and state governments (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2010). The royalty rates on oil and gas production differ by land ownership, with state royalties
higher than the federal rate of 12.5%, a level set by and unchanged since the passage of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. In contrast, the royalty rate for oil and gas production on state lands
in Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming is 16.67%; in New Mexico it is 18.75% (Center for
Western Priorities, 2015). The higher royalty rates on state lands reflect the states’ revenuemaximizing mandate but are also a disincentive to producers since state lands are in competition
with federal and private lands for the attention of potential oil and gas producers. In sum, with
respect to the oil and gas leasing and permitting process, federal lands have higher regulatory
barriers (e.g. NEPA) but lower royalty rates, while state lands have generally lower regulatory
barriers (e.g. no NEPA) but higher royalty rates.
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EMPIRICAL MODELING AND DATA

4.1 Empirical modeling
An area of inquiry on the role of institutions that has received little attention in the
literature is the effect of the type of land ownership associated with areas of resource abundance.
For example, differences between federal and state institutional mandates regarding land use and
resource development in the western states may have significant effects on local economic
outcomes. To the best of my knowledge, only two studies have noted the potential relevance of
institutional land ownerships to resource-based development outcomes, although neither explored
the issue in any detail. First, Haggerty et al. (2014) noted that public versus private ownership of
oil and gas resources may have an effect on local socioeconomic outcomes due to the potential
for private landowners to collect oil and gas royalties. To control for this, they include among
their predictors a variable measuring the percent of oil and gas basin land under private
ownership. However, they use a principal components analysis (PCA) to collapse this and other
variables into a smaller number of orthogonal ‘components’ which describe most of the variance
in the original predictors. Since the use of PCA hinders the direct interpretation of the effects of
the original variables, they do not discuss the effect of the private land ownership variable.
Second, Weber (2012) included a variable indicating whether a county had greater than 30%
federal land ownership as a robustness check of his results. He reported that the federal ownership
indicator did not change his results, and did not report the details of its inclusion in his
regressions.
To contribute to this gap in the literature, this study estimates the effects of federal, state,
and private ownerships of oil and gas resources in the counties of eight western states: Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. Recognizing the
endogeneity concerns of measuring resources as a ratio to the magnitude of other activities in the

23
economy, oil and gas endowment is measured as the percent overlap of a county with an oil and
gas basin (Fig. 3); this measure of resource abundance does not change over time. GIS data on
land ownerships in the region (Fig. 4) is then used to disaggregate this overall resource abundance
measure to reflect institutional land ownerships associated with federal, state, and private entities.
As noted in the literature review, when considering the role of institutions in economic
development, an important distinction exists between short term policy effects as opposed to the
influence of ‘deep and durable’ institutional characteristics of a society (Brunnschweiller and
Bulte, 2008). Noting that institutions can be considered the cumulative outcomes of past policy
actions, Rodrik et al. (2004) suggest that institutions can be appropriately modelled as
determinants of income levels, whereas policy effects are more appropriately estimated using
growth equations. Following this line of reasoning and the approaches of Alexeev and Conrad
(2009) and Michaels (2010), my main modeling specification uses income levels as the dependent
variable:

𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿1 𝑂𝐺 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(5)

where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 represents the natural log of per capita salary and wage income in county i in year t,
𝑂𝐺 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 is the percent of county land that overlaps an oil and gas field, and 𝑋𝑖 is a set of control
variables including state fixed effects. Resource effects on salary and wage levels are assessed at
four times: 1990, 2000, 2007, and 2010. The 1990 and to a lesser extent the 2000 levels capture
conditions before the natural gas boom in the region while the 2007 and 2010 levels reflect the
tremendous increase in production associated with the oil and gas boom period. Although 2007
and 2010 are only separated by three years, both dates are used in order to control for effects of
the Great Recession which began in December 2007.
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Fig. 3. Oil and gas basins in the eight states of the Intermountain West.
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Fig. 4. Land ownership in the study area.
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Equation 5 assesses the long term effect of oil and gas abundance on per capita salary and
wage incomes. The use of levels instead of growth rates allows the entire arc of resource
development – from discovery to production to (as applicable) eventual depletion – to be
reflected in the parameter estimate on the resource variable. After assessing the overall effect of
oil and gas abundance on salary and wag levels, institutional effects are estimated by dropping
𝑂𝐺 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 and replacing it with variables measuring the proportional federal, state, and private
ownerships of oil and gas lands in county i.
The level regressions are intended to provide insight into the long-term impact of oil and
gas abundance on county wage levels. Since resource abundance can have a significant effect on
the historical development of a county’s economic structure (Michaels, 2010), variables which
measure a county’s economic structure – such as dependence on mining, manufacturing, or
service industries – are potentially endogenous to the influence of resource abundance and are not
used in the level regressions.
To accommodate the more common use of growth regressions in the resource curse
literature, I also estimate growth regressions by using the annual growth in per capita salary and
wage income over the periods 1990-2000, 1990-2007, 1990-2010, 2000-2007 and 2000-2010 as
the dependent variable in Eq. 5, and add the natural log of initial per capita salary and wage
income as a control variable. In the growth regressions, exogenous demand shocks to the local
labor market are controlled for using the Bartik Instrument (Bartik, 1991). This variable averages
national employment growth across the farm, private non-farm, and government sectors using
local sectoral employment shares as weights:

𝐺𝑚𝑡−𝑥,𝑡 = [∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡−𝑥 ∗
𝑗

𝐸𝑗𝑡 − 𝐸𝑗𝑡−𝑥
] /𝑥
𝐸𝑗𝑡−𝑥

(6)
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where 𝐺𝑚𝑡−𝑥,𝑡 represents expected annual employment growth in county m from time t-x to time t
due to exogenous labor demand shocks; 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡−𝑥 represents the proportion of total jobs in county
m in industry j at time t-x, and 𝐸𝑗𝑡 and 𝐸𝑗𝑡−𝑥 represent national employment levels in industry j at
times t and t-x, respectively. Dividing the RHS term by the number of years, x, renders an
estimate of the expected annual employment growth rate in county m due to exogenous labor
demand shocks. Results from growth models will be more indicative of the short run influence of
ownership types on performance during the recent natural gas boom in the region.
The robustness of the institutional effects in level and growth regressions is checked
using an alternative model specification:

𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿1 𝑂𝐺 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿2 𝐹𝐸𝐷 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖 + 𝛿3 𝐹𝐸𝐷 𝑂𝐺𝑖 + 𝛿4 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖
(7)
+ 𝛿5 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 𝑂𝐺𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

where FED ALL and STATE ALL measure the total proportion of county land owned by the
Forest Service and BLM, or by state agencies, respectively. In this specification, the 𝛿1 parameter
measures the wage effect of overall oil and gas abundance, including the effect of those areas
captured by the FED OG and STATE OG variables. The 𝛿2 and 𝛿4 parameters measure the
effects of overall federal and state land ownerships, including both oil and gas abundant lands and
other public lands. Finally, the 𝛿3 and 𝛿5 parameters measure the additional wage effects federal
and state ownerships associated with areas of oil and gas abundance, respectively. Thus, the
marginal wage effect of federal oil and gas ownership is captured by 𝛿1 + 𝛿2 + 𝛿3 , and the
marginal effect of state oil and gas ownership is captured by 𝛿1 + 𝛿4 + 𝛿5 . The significance of
the statistical difference between the FED OG effect and the STATE OG effect is assessed by
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netting out the 𝛿1 parameter and using and F-test on the equivalence of 𝛿2 + 𝛿3 (the FED OG
effect) versus 𝛿4 + 𝛿5 (the STATE OG effect), which follow an F-distribution.
In the other models with institutional ownership variables, two-tailed t-tests are used to
test for the equivalence of the parameter estimates on FED OG and STATE OG. In these tests,
the null hypothesis is that the effects of the two variables are equivalent, and the alternative
hypothesis is that they are not equivalent. The t statistic provides a measure of whether the
difference in the parameter estimates on FED OG and STATE OG is sufficiently large to reject
the null hypothesis:

𝑡 = (𝛿̂1 − 𝛿̂2 )/𝑠𝑒(𝛿̂1 − 𝛿̂2 )

(8)

where 𝛿̂1 and 𝛿̂2 are the parameter estimates on STATE OG and FED OG, and the denominator
measures the standard error of the difference in the parameter estimates. The t statistic is then
compared to critical values of the student’s t distribution based on the degrees of freedom in the
regression model to determine the statistical significance of the difference in the parameter
estimates.

4.2

Data

4.2.1

Economic variables
Data on salary and wage income was acquired from the Bureau of Economic Analysis

(BEA) and converted to constant 2012 dollars. Salary and wage income is used as the dependent
variable because it excludes sources of unearned income such as dividends, social security
payments, unemployment benefits and other government transfer payments. It is thus more
reflective of the quality of the local labor market and is more closely linked to local resource
abundance than would be total income. Salary and wage income levels were measured as the
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natural log of per capita salary and wage income in 1990, 2000, 2007, and 2010. Annual growth
rates in salary and wage income over the periods 1990-2000, 1990-2007, 1990-2010, 2000-2007,
and 2000-2010 were measured as the log of the ratio of end-of-period per capita salary and wage
levels to initial per capita levels, multiplied by 100 and divided by the number of years. The
Bartik Instruments used in the growth regressions were calculated using employment data on total
jobs from the BEA. For the growth periods 2000-2007 and 2000-2010, the Bartik Instruments
were calculated using 2001 as the base year so that definitions of farm, private non-farm, and
government sectors consistently used North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
classifications.
The eight states of the study area are comprised of 281 counties. Broomfield County,
Colorado was created out of portions of 4 other counties (Adams, Boulder, Jefferson, and Weld)
in 2001. Growth rates could not be calculated for these five counties and they were not included
in the analysis. Counties with large urban areas, identified by the presence of a Census-designated
“central city”, are also excluded from the analysis. These regions have more diverse economies
than rural counties and are likely to have higher wage levels and growth rates due to economies
of scale (Dixit, 1973) and agglomeration effects (Krugman, 1991). Dropping the 26 counties that
meet this criteria renders the final sample of 250 counties.

4.2.2

Oil and gas and land ownership variables
Resource endowment is measured as the percent of county land that overlays a coalbed

methane or shale oil basin, as mapped by the United States Geological Survey (Fig. 4). There is
significant spatial correlation in the location of the shale and coalbed methane basins, and often
both oil and natural gas can be produced from the same geological strata. For clarity and
simplicity, all shale basins and coalbed methane basins are referred to as oil and gas basins. It
should be noted that the location of coal fields were not used in this study but were largely
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Table 1. Data, sources and descriptions.
Dependent
Description
variables
WAGE 1990
Per capita salary and wage income in 1990 ($2012)
WAGE 2000
Per capita salary and wage income in 2000 ($2012)
WAGE 2007
Per capita salary and wage income in 2007 ($2012)
WAGE 2010
Per capita salary and wage income in 2010 ($2012)
WAGE 1990-2000
Average annual percent growth in salary and wage
income from 1990 to 2000. Measured as the natural
log of the ratio of per capita wage and salary income
in 1990 to per capita wage and salary income in 2000,
times 100 and divided by the number of years in the
time period, 10.
WAGE 1990-2007
1990-2007 version of WAGE 1990-2000
WAGE 1990-2010
1990-2010 version of WAGE 1990-2000
WAGE 2000-2007
2000-2007 version of WAGE 1990-2000
WAGE 2000-2010
2000-2010 version of WAGE 1990-2000
Independent
Description
variables
OG PCT
Percent of county land area that overlays oil and gas
basins

FED OG,
STATE OG,
PRIV OG
FED ALL,
STATE ALL
COLLEGE
OLD
BARTIK 1990-2000

BARTIK 1990-2007
BARTIK 1990-2010
BARTIK 2001-2007
BARTIK 2001-2010

Percent of county land area that overlays oil and gas
basins and is administered by federal institutions (US
Forest Service and BLM), state agencies, or private
parties, respectively.
Percent of county land area that is administered by
federal institutions (US Forest Service and BLM), or
state agencies, respectively
Percent of county population with a 4 year college
degree
Percent of county population that is at least 65 years
old
Bartik Instrument for time period 1990-2000: provides
a measure of expected annual employment growth due
to exogenous labor demand shocks. Measured as the
weighted average of national growth rates in the farm,
private non-farm, and government sectors, with
weights equal to the proportion of county employment
in those three sectors.
1990-2007 version of BARTIK 1990-2000
1990-2010 version of BARTIK 1990-2000
2000-2007 version of BARTIK 1990-2000
2000-2010 version of BARTIK 1990-2000

Source
BEA
BEA
BEA
BEA
BEA

BEA
BEA
BEA
BEA
Source
Energy
Information
Administration
(EIA)
EIA, USGS,
PADUS

U.S. Census
U.S. Census
BEA

BEA
BEA
BEA
BEA
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spatially coincident with coalbed methane and shale basins. The oil and gas basin data is treated it
as a sufficiently exogenous measure of resource abundance as it was produced by federal
agencies and its quality is likely independent of local issues. Assessments of economically
recoverable reserves of oil and gas are not used to define resource abundance because reserves
are a fluid classification which is sensitive to the certainty of geological knowledge and economic
and technological conditions (Howe, 1979; Fig. 5). That is, increased geologic knowledge and

Fig. 5. Classification of resource reserves by economic feasibility and certainty of geologic
knowledge. Source: Howe (1979).

32
improved economic circumstances act to move resources out of the “undiscovered” or
“subeconomic” categories of Fig. 5 towards the “reserves” area (Howe 1979).
Land ownership information was acquired from the USGS’s Protected Area Database of
the United States (PADUS; USGS, 2012), a GIS database which maps land ownerships
nationwide (Fig. 4). The federal ownership variables used in the level and growth regressions
were defined based on lands owned by the Forest Service or the BLM. Lands owned by other
federal agencies such as the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, or Departments of
Defense and Energy were excluded because they are generally less available for oil and gas
development, and comprise a relatively small portion of lands in the sample of counties (4.5%)
compared to the BLM (26.8%) and Forest Service (18.4%). Lands not included in PADUS were
assigned private land ownership after comparison with another dataset of land ownership in the
region (SAGEMAP) indicated that the overwhelming majority (>97%) of lands not included in
the PADUS database are private lands. State and private lands comprised 7.2% and 35.5% of the
land area of the sample of counties, respectively. All water areas were excluded from oil and gas
and institutional ownership variables. The variables FED OG, STATE OG, and PRIV OG were
defined as the percent of county oil and gas lands administered by the federal, state, and private
categories, respectively. Summary statistics for response, resource, and land ownership variables
are presented in Table 2.
Due to spatial autocorrelation in the oil and gas basin and land ownership data,
institutional variables are also likely to be correlated, giving rise to concern about
multicollinearity in the regression models. Three techniques were used to assess this concern.
First, correlations among all of the institutional variables were examined (Table 3). The OG PCT
variable is highly correlated with the institutional oil and gas ownership variables. This may be a
concern in the alternative institutional model specification (Eq. 7). Otherwise, only the PRIV OG
and STATE OG variables (r = 0.64) and the FED ALL and PRIV OG variables (r = -0.52) have
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: response, resource, and land ownership variables.
Response variable
Mean
SD
Minimum
WAGE 1990
12360
14658
3436
WAGE 2000
13721
14946
4717
WAGE 2007
16735
21941
5417
WAGE 2010
12066
15568
3785
WAGE 1990-2000
1.209
2.628
-0.005
WAGE 1990-2007
1.700
1.830
-0.024
WAGE 1990-2010
-0.157
1.577
-0.007
WAGE 2000-2007
2.400
2.711
-0.006
WAGE 2000-2010
-1.523
2.042
-0.019
Resource or land
ownership variable
Mean
SD
Minimum
OG PCT
32.9
39.0
0
FED OG
9.1
15.9
0
STATE OG
2.3
4.0
0
PRIV OG
18.3
27.7
0
FED ALL
40.4
27.7
0
STATE ALL
7.0
5.8
0
Monetary amounts are in 2012 dollars.

Table 3. Correlation among resource and land ownership variables.
FED OG STATE OG
PRIV OG
FED ALL
OG PCT
0.59
0.72
0.84
-0.35
FED OG
0.37
0.16
0.25
STATE OG
0.64
-0.3
PRIV OG
-0.52
FED ALL

Maximum
166725
186704
246599
194610
26.560
15.148
11.516
15.698
8.429
Maximum
100
68.5
34.1
96.1
97.5
34.9

STATE ALL
0.03
-0.05
0.38
0.06
-0.3

correlation coefficients above 0.4, however the correlation between FED ALL and PRIV OG is
not a concern because these two variables are not included together as regressors in any model.
The second collinearity assessment used was an examination of the variance inflation
factors (VIF; Davis et al., 1986) for the variables in each model. The VIF technique iteratively
regresses each independent variable (IV) in a given regression model on all of the other IVs in the
model. If most of the variance of a particular IV can be explained by a linear combination of the

34
other IVs, then multicollinearity may be problem with respect to that IV. The VIF score is
calculated as VIF = 1/(1 - R2), where the R2 value is taken from the regression of the IV in
question on all of the other IVs in the model. If the R2 value is high, the VIF score will be high,
indicating collinearity. As a rule of thumb, any VIF value above 10 is cause for concern (Kutner
et al., 2004).
The third multicollinearity assessment technique used was the condition index assessment
(Belsley et al., 1980). For a given regression model, this technique decomposes the matrix of
continuous RHS variables into orthogonal ‘components’ created as linear combinations of the
RHS variables, such that the first component explains the most variance in the data, the second
component explains the next largest variance, and so on. The variance of each component is
called an eigenvalue, and the condition index (CI) score for each component is a simple function
of the eigenvalues: 𝐶𝐼𝑖 = √𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 /𝜆𝑖 where 𝜆 is the symbol for an eigenvalue. The largest
eigenvalue indicates how much of the total variation in the RHS variables can be explained by a
single linear combination of the variables. A very large eigenvalue on the first component would
therefore be an indication of possible multicollinearity in the data. While the CI score on the first
component will always be equal to one, CI scores on subsequent components will increase
proportional to the diminishing amounts of variation in the RHS matrix they explain. A high CI
score is therefore indicative of a component which explains very little of the overall variation in
the RHS matrix. By examining the proportional contribution of each independent variable to
components with high CI scores, the CI technique allows the identification of those variables
which, compared to the other RHS variables, are contributing little independent variation in the
data and are therefore primary sources of multicollinearity in the model. Belsley et al. (1980)
suggest that CI scores greater than 30 are indicative of potentially problematic multicollinearity.
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4.2.3 Demographic control variables
County characteristics that may affect growth are controlled for by including variables
describing county variation in human capital and demographic characteristics (Table 4). Human
capital was measured by the percent of the population with at least a four year college education
(COLLEGE). Three variables reflecting demographic characteristics were assessed: the
proportion of the population that is under 19 years old (YOUNG), the proportion that is over 65
years old (OLD), and the proportion that is white (WHITE). Bloom et al. (2000) argue that areas
with high proportions of young and old people tend to have lower per capita income because
young and old people tend to be less productive and are often excluded from the labor force.
Similarly, Malmberg (1994) argues that the lower rate of saving among young and old people will
tend to depress per capita income levels. The WHITE variable reflects social homogeneity, which
may increase productivity through its impact on trust (Zak and Knack, 2001). Values of these
covariates for years 1990, 2000 and 2010 were taken from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. censuses.
Values for 2007 were taken from the American Community Survey which averages values of the
time period 2005 – 2009.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics: control variables.
Variable
Mean
COLLEGE 1990
10.1
COLLEGE 2000
19.3
COLLEGE 2007
21
COLLEGE 2010
21.4
OLD 1990
13.4
OLD 2000
13.7
OLD 2007
15.2
OLD 2010
16
BARTIK 1990-2000
1.619
BARTIK 1990-2007
1.380
BARTIK 1990-2010
0.978
BARTIK 2001-2007
1.049
BARTIK 2001-2010
0.326

SD
4.9
9
9.4
9.6
4.6
4.5
5.4
5
0.288
0.345
0.256
0.374
0.197

Minimum
3.8
8.7
7.6
5.3
2.3
3
4.1
5.6
0.6325
0.1485
0.0473
-0.088
-0.3027

Maximum
37.3
60.5
63.4
64
31.5
28.3
36.5
32.6
2.118
1.922
1.347
1.586
0.6245
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Preliminary modeling indicated that the WHITE and YOUNG variables did not have a
significant association with wage levels or growth rates. Additionally, CI scores indicated that the
WHITE and YOUNG variables were sources of multicollinearity in the data due to their
significant contribution to components with CI scores greater than 30 (Belsley et al., 1980).
Based on these diagnostics, WHITE and YOUNG were dropped from all models.
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RESULTS

Before turning to the results of the level and growth regressions, let us consider the
general characteristics of the relationship between oil and gas abundance and wages by
examining average county wage levels and growth rates by quintiles of OG PCT values (Table 5).
In terms of wage levels, there appears to be a positive association with oil and gas abundance
only for relatively low levels of oil and gas abundance. While wage levels in the counties of the
second quintile exceed those in counties with no oil and gas abundance, wage levels in quintiles
three through five exhibit a generally negative trajectory and are usually lower than wage levels
in counties with no oil and gas resources. This simple assessment suggests that in small amounts
resource abundance may be a blessing but larger endowments of resources may have detrimental
effects.
In contrast, the association of oil and gas abundance quintiles with wage growth rates is
just the opposite. Compared to counties with no oil and gas resources, those in the second quintile
suffer from lower wage growth while well-endowed counties in the third through fifth quintiles
enjoy successively higher growth rates that usually exceed those observed in counties with no oil
and gas resources.
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Table 5. Average wage levels and growth rates by oil and gas abundance quintiles.
OG PCT quintile
1
2
3
4
5
Value range
[0,0]
(0,8.48]
(8.48,50.9]
(50.9,90.3]
(90.3,100]
No. of counties
84
42
41
41
42
WAGE 1990
13202
14046
12092
10743
10827
WAGE 2000
14179
14720
14140
12130
12950
WAGE 2007
17391
17570
16131
15752
16137
WAGE 2010
12871
11960
11217
11352
12088
WAGE 1990 – 2000
1.121
0.65
1.503
1.17
1.696
WAGE 1990 – 2007
1.532
1.187
1.766
1.957
2.232
WAGE 1990 – 2010
-0.337
-0.663
-0.207
0.147
0.461
WAGE 2000 – 2007
2.12
1.953
2.143
3.08
2.997
WAGE 2000 – 2010
-1.795
-1.977
-1.916
-0.876
-0.775

Notably, the distribution of oil and gas resources is not normally distributed among the
counties of the region. Instead, oil and gas is distributed in a roughly bimodal distribution across
the sample counties (Fig. 6), indicating that there is limited middle ground in terms of oil and gas
endowment: a county generally either has a lot of oil and gas lands, or very little. For the 84

Fig. 6. Distribution of oil and gas abundance across 250 counties in the Intermountain West.
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counties that do not overlay an oil and gas basin, the consequences of oil and gas development
will likely be of limited practical importance.

5.1

Level regression results
The effects of overall oil and gas abundance on per capita wage levels in 1990, 2000,

2007, and 2010 are presented in Table 6. The coefficient on the percent overlap of county land
with an oil and gas basin, OG PCT, is positive and significant at a 5% level in 1990 and at a 1%
in level in 2000, 2007, and 2010. The estimated marginal effect on wage levels of each additional
percent of county land overlaying an oil and gas basin ranges from 0.17% in 1990 to 0.26% in
2007, at the peak of oil and gas prices. The presence of positive and significant effects of OG
PCT in 1990, before the boom in prices and production (Fig. 1), suggests that there are durable
beneficial effects associated with oil and gas abundance which are not dependent on a booming
resource sector.
An F-test for the equality of state-specific fixed effects strongly rejects the null
hypothesis in all time periods, suggesting that state-level policies significantly affect county wage
levels. Both of the demographic control variables had significant effects in expected directions.
The adjusted R squared values range from 0.256 to 0.325, indicating that the models do a
reasonable job of explaining the variation in county wage levels. Taken together, these results
indicate well specified models and suggest that oil and gas abundance has been a blessing for
wage levels in the counties of the Intermountain West, not a curse.
In all level regressions (Tables 6, 7, and 8), VIF scores for all variables were less than 6
and component CI scores were never larger than 17, indicating that these models did not suffer
from severe multicollinearity problems.
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Table 6. OLS results: Level effects of oil and gas abundance on county salaries and wages in
1990, 2000, 2007, and 2010.
Dependent variable:
ln(WAGE 1990) ln(WAGE 2000) ln(WAGE 2007) ln(WAGE 2010)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Constant
9.4467***
9.2573***
9.3680***
9.2510***
(0.1594)
(0.1573)
(0.1383)
(0.1567)
**
***
***
OG PCT
0.0017
0.0019
0.0026
0.0024***
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
(0.0007)
***
***
***
COLLEGE
0.0258
0.0199
0.0193
0.0142***
(0.0085)
(0.0045)
(0.0039)
(0.0040)
***
***
***
YOUNG
-0.0298
-0.0182
-0.0160
-0.0243***
(0.0058)
(0.0058)
(0.0053)
(0.0053)
***
***
***
F statistic: State FEs
8.421
7.373
6.442
5.956***
Observations
250
250
250
250
2
Adjusted R
0.3247
0.3156
0.2845
0.2559
***
***
***
F Statistic (df = 12; 237)
12.9714
12.4820
10.9014
9.5612***
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

When oil and gas abundance is disaggregated by institutional ownership type, positive
and significant effects on county wage levels are estimated for both federal and state ownerships
(Table 7). The results are particularly striking for the STATE OG variable, which has large
effects on wage levels in all years. For every additional percent of county land owned by the state
and overlaying an oil and gas basin, county wage levels were 1% higher in 1990; 1.6% higher in
2000; 1.4% higher in 2007 and 1.5% higher in 2010. In 1990 the STATE OG effects were
significant at a 5% level; in 2000, 2007, and 2010 the effects were significant at a 1% level. In
contrast, the parameter estimates on the FED OG variable, while positive at all time periods and
significant in three of the four, are of a magnitude one-third to one-ninth the size of the STATE
OG effect. The difference in magnitude between the FED OG and STATE OG effects is
significant at a 1% level in the 2000 and 2010 regressions; the differences are not quite significant
in the 1990 and 2007 regressions (t statistic p-values of 0.161 and 0.106, respectively). These
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results show that state ownership of oil and gas resources consistently produces greater positive
effects on county wage levels than federal ownership. The coefficient on private oil and gas
ownership, PRIV OG, is insignificant in all time periods, and its positive parameter estimate is
usually an order of magnitude smaller than the FED OG parameter estimate. This is a somewhat
surprising result given the consistently positive results of other resource variables. The effects of
state dummy variables and demographic covariates remain largely unchanged from the previous
level regression on overall oil and gas abundance.

Table 7. OLS results: Level effects of institutional ownerships of oil and gas lands on county
salaries and wages in 1990, 2000, 2007, and 2010.
Dependent variable:
ln(WAGE 1990) ln(WAGE 2000) ln(WAGE 2007) ln(WAGE 2010)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Constant
9.4548***
9.2691***
9.3897***
9.2667***
(0.1595)
(0.1566)
(0.1382)
(0.1549)
**
**
FED OG
0.0032
0.0019
0.0043
0.0030*
(0.0015)
(0.0014)
(0.0018)
(0.0017)
**
***
***
STATE OG
0.0099
0.0163
0.0142
0.0145***
(0.0043)
(0.0042)
(0.0050)
(0.0045)
PRIV OG
0.0002
0.0001
0.0005
0.0008
(0.0012)
(0.0011)
(0.0012)
(0.0013)
***
***
***
COLLEGE
0.0247
0.0197
0.0186
0.0138***
(0.0087)
(0.0045)
(0.0039)
(0.0041)
***
***
***
OLD
-0.0298
-0.0188
-0.0166
-0.0249***
(0.0059)
(0.0059)
(0.0052)
(0.0053)
***
***
***
F statistic: State FEs
8.32
7.064
5.749
5.595***
t statistic:
1.347
2.943***
1.629
2.145**
FED OG = STATE OG
Observations
250
250
250
250
Adjusted R2
0.3259
0.3174
0.2884
0.2569
F Statistic (df = 14; 235)
11.0296***
10.6493***
9.4115***
8.1719***
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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In the alternative institutional model specification (Table 8), the STATE OG variable has
a positive and significant effect in three of the four time periods, and is statistically different from
FED OG in two of these periods, while FED OG is not significant in any time period. The only
other land ownership variable that has a significant effect on wage levels is the overall amount of

Table 8. OLS results: Level effects of institutional land ownerships on county salaries and
wages in 1990, 2000, 2007, and 2010.
Dependent variable:
ln(WAGE 1990) ln(WAGE 2000) ln(WAGE 2007) ln(WAGE 2010)
Constant
9.3122***
9.1941***
9.3415***
9.2236***
(0.1722)
(0.1683)
(0.1459)
(0.1634)
FED ALL
0.0028**
0.0013
0.0015
0.0014
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
(0.0014)
FED OG
-0.00004
0.0002
0.0019
0.0006
(0.0022)
(0.0022)
(0.0025)
(0.0024)
STATE ALL
0.0028
0.0026
-0.0032
-0.0021
(0.0063)
(0.0060)
(0.0065)
(0.0075)
*
**
STATE OG
0.0064
0.0120
0.0152
0.0156**
(0.0064)
(0.0063)
(0.0073)
(0.0077)
OG PCT
0.0017
0.0012
0.0012
0.0013
(0.0013)
(0.0012)
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
**
***
***
COLLEGE
0.0229
0.0195
0.0179
0.0131***
(0.0092)
(0.0046)
(0.0039)
(0.0041)
***
***
***
OLD
-0.0295
-0.0190
-0.0163
-0.0248***
(0.0062)
(0.0063)
(0.0055)
(0.0056)
***
***
***
F statistic: State FEs
7.443
6.76
5.439
5.446***
F statistic: Equivalence
of federal and state oil
1.78
7.65***
2.33
5.48**
and gas effects
Observations
250
250
250
250
Adjusted R2
0.3303
0.3145
0.2875
0.2540
F Statistic
9.7737***
9.1583***
8.1779***
7.0565***
(df = 14; 235)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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federal land, FED ALL, which has a positive and significant parameter estimate on 1990 wage
levels. The FED ALL effects are usually larger than the FED OG effects, suggesting that federal
lands with oil and gas deposits do not contribute to faster wage growth than do federal lands with
no oil and gas resources. On the other hand, STATE ALL effects are much smaller than STATE
OG effects in all time periods, suggesting that state lands with oil and gas deposits do contribute
to faster wage growth than do state lands with no oil and gas resources. Taken together, these
results provide additional support for the beneficial effect of state oil and gas ownership as well
as its comparatively beneficial effect compared to federal oil and gas ownership.

5.2

Growth regression results
The parameter estimates in the growth regressions can be interpreted as expected

percentage point adjustments to county wage growth rates. For example, the 0.0074 parameter
estimate on the OG PCT variable in the 1990-2000 growth regressions (Table 9) suggests that a
resource-rich county in which 100% of the land area overlays an oil and gas basin would
experience annual wage growth 0.74 percentage points higher than an otherwise identical but
resource-poor county with no oil and gas land. Turning to the rest of the results in Table 9,
parameter estimates on the OG PCT variable are positive and significant in all time periods
analyzed. In the 1990-2007 period annual growth rates in the hypothetical resource-rich and
resource-poor counties would diverge by 0.92 percentage points; in the 1990-2010, 2000-2007,
and 2000-2010 periods the growth rate divergence would be 0.80, 1.2, and 0.83 percentage
points, respectively.
In comparison with average growth rates in the sample of counties, these differences
represent large and quite consistent effects. For example, a 0.74 percentage point effect in the
1990-2000 period represents a 66% increase over the period mean of 1.121%; the 0.92 percentage
point effect in the 1990-2007 period represents a 60% increase over the period mean of 1.532%;
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and the 1.2 percentage point effect in the 2000-2007 period represents a 57% increase over the
period mean of 2.12%.
The effects of the demographic covariates in the growth regressions presented in Table 9
are less consistent than they were in the level regression results. The COLLEGE variable
continues to have a positive and significant effect on wages in most time periods, although in the
2000-2007 period the effect is insignificant. The negative parameter estimate on COLLEGE in

Table 9. OLS results: Effects of oil and gas abundance on annual growth rates of county salaries
and wages.
Dependent variable:
WAGE 1990- WAGE 1990- WAGE 1990- WAGE 2000- WAGE 20002000
2007
2010
2007
2010
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
***
***
**
Constant
24.2311
15.3636
10.6081
5.8195
-1.1287
(8.1623)
(5.9518)
(5.2353)
(6.4026)
(4.9239)
***
**
**
ln(initial WAGE)
-2.9668
-1.6800
-1.3167
-0.3848
-0.0212
(0.9737)
(0.6904)
(0.6087)
(0.7376)
(0.5605)
*
***
***
**
OG PCT
0.0074
0.0092
0.0080
0.0120
0.0083**
(0.0039)
(0.0030)
(0.0026)
(0.0056)
(0.0038)
**
BARTIK
1.5372
0.4274
0.3075
0.0509
-0.5459
(0.7341)
(0.4293)
(0.5272)
(0.5040)
(0.6807)
***
***
***
COLLEGE
0.2070
0.1285
0.0798
0.0049
-0.0316*
(0.0441)
(0.0298)
(0.0264)
(0.0242)
(0.0191)
OLD
-0.0066
-0.0069
0.0012
-0.0195
-0.0037
(0.0384)
(0.0264)
(0.0228)
(0.0353)
(0.0288)
F statistic: State
2.579**
1.818*
1.27
2.057**
3.485***
FEs
Observations
250
250
250
250
250
Adjusted R2
0.3184
0.2196
0.1886
0.0375
0.1096
F Statistic (df = 13;
10.6936***
6.8384***
5.8216***
1.8095**
3.5545***
236)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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the 2000-2010 period may be attributable to the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. The
negative sign on the OLD variable is expected, and insignificant in all time periods. Initial wage
levels are always negative and usually significant, indicating a convergence of wage levels across
the sample counties. Finally, the F test for the equality of state fixed effects indicates that these
variables are jointly significant only in the 2000-2007 and 2000-2010 periods, suggesting that
differences in state policies had little effect on wage growth in the earlier time periods. The Rsquared values are substantially lower than those of the level regressions, suggesting that the
effects of resources on wages may be better estimated using levels as the response.
In the growth regressions multicollinearity is more of a concern than it was in the level
regressions. While VIF scores for all variables in all growth regressions (Tables 9, 10, and 11)
were less than 6, CI scores indicated that muticollinearity may be an issue. The largest CI scores
in the growth regressions ranged from 70 to 89, and were associated with components mostly
defined by the intercept and initial income terms. The next highest CI scores in the growth
models ranged from 13 to 25 and were associated with components mostly defined by linear
combinations of the BARTIK and OLD variables.
In the first institutional growth regression specification (Table 10), wage growth effects
of the institutional oil and gas ownership variables are shown to be less consistent than their level
effects. While the parameter estimates on the FED OG and STATE OG variables are still mostly
positive, they are each only significant in one of the five time periods. The effect of state
ownership is larger than that of federal ownership in four of the five time periods. During the
period 1990-2000 FED OG has a negative effect while each additional unit of STATE OG is
associated with a 0.0571 percentage point increase in wage growth; an almost significant
difference (t statistic p-value: 0.112). Over the period 1990-2007 the marginal effect of STATE
OG is almost four times that of FED OG (t statistic p-value: 0.29); in 1990-2010 the factor
difference is 36 (T statistic p-value: 0.104); and in 2000-2010 the two estimates are of similar

46
magnitude. The time period 2000-2007 is something of an anomaly in the results, with the FED
OG effect much larger than the negative STATE OG effect; however, the two effects are not
significantly different (T statistic p-value: 0.322). Parameter estimates for the third institutional

Table 10. OLS results: Effects of institutional ownerships of oil and gas lands on annual growth
rates of county salaries and wages.
Dependent variable:
WAGE
WAGE
WAGE
WAGE
WAGE
1990-2000
1990-2007
1990-2010 2000-2007 2000-2010
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
***
***
**
Constant
24.1591
15.5761
10.7511
5.8124
-0.9839
(8.1440)
(5.9968)
(5.2570)
(6.4698)
(5.0052)
***
**
**
ln(initial WAGE)
-2.9606
-1.6861
-1.3228
-0.3474
-0.0254
(0.9704)
(0.6943)
(0.6102)
(0.7449)
(0.5686)
**
FED OG
-0.0112
0.0090
0.0011
0.0360
0.0125
(0.0091)
(0.0084)
(0.0066)
(0.0158)
(0.0092)
*
STATE OG
0.0571
0.0320
0.0398
-0.0079
0.0138
(0.0367)
(0.0237)
(0.0204)
(0.0585)
(0.0386)
PRIV OG
0.0068
0.0062
0.0063
0.0069
0.0067
(0.0062)
(0.0049)
(0.0044)
(0.0094)
(0.0069)
**
BARTIK
1.6692
0.4084
0.3664
-0.1877
-0.5784
(0.7354)
(0.4343)
(0.5333)
(0.5403)
(0.7261)
COLLEGE
0.2033***
0.1238***
0.0759***
0.0017
-0.0336*
(0.0448)
(0.0304)
(0.0267)
(0.0247)
(0.0193)
OLD
-0.0184
-0.0138
-0.0069
-0.0238
-0.0086
(0.0374)
(0.0267)
(0.0231)
(0.0354)
(0.0289)
***
*
F statistic: State FEs
2.827
1.335
1.238
2.001
3.451***
t statistic:
FED OG =
1.596
0.798
1.638
0.653
0.032
STATE OG
Observations
250
250
250
250
250
2
Adjusted R
0.3215
0.2121
0.1845
0.0480
0.1032
F Statistic (df = 15;
9.4264***
5.7869***
5.0244***
1.8964**
3.0468***
234)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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ownership category, private ownership, remain consistently small and insignificant in all
regressions.
In the alternative institutional model specification (Table 11), parameter estimates on the
STATE OG and FED OG variables are positive in all time periods. Although the effects are
statistically insignificant, this suggests that public lands with oil and gas deposits contribute to
faster wage growth than do public lands with no oil and gas resources. A similar effect is seen in
the private land category, where positive, albeit small and statistically insignificant, parameter
estimates on the OG PCT variable indicate that oil and gas abundance on private lands
contributes to faster wage growth than does private land ownership without oil and gas resources.
While the magnitudes of STATE OG effects are at least three times larger than the FED OG
effects in four of the five periods, the differences between the effects are insignificant, although
in the 1990-2000 and 1990-2010 periods they are almost significant (p-values of 0.112 and 0.104,
respectively). In the 2000-2007 period, the STATE OG effect is slightly larger than the FED OG
effect, in contrast to the anomalous result for this time period from the first institutional growth
regression (Table 11), where FED OG outperformed STATE OG. Finally, the overall amount of
public land in a county, whether federal or state, is shown to have a generally negative effect on
wage growth in most time periods, with the FED ALL variable having a significant negative
effect in the 1990-2000, 1990-2007, and 1990-2010 periods.
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Table 11. OLS results: Effects of institutional land ownerships on annual growth rates of county
salaries and wages.
Dependent variable:
WAGE 1990- WAGE 1990- WAGE 1990- WAGE 2000- WAGE 20002000
2007
2010
2007
2010
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
***
***
**
Constant
23.9553
15.5802
10.7392
5.9611
-0.7986
(8.0871)
(5.9428)
(5.1963)
(6.5099)
(4.9866)
***
**
**
ln(initial WAGE)
-2.9112
-1.6500
-1.2871
-0.3323
-0.0165
(0.9799)
(0.6956)
(0.6102)
(0.7378)
(0.5592)
FED ALL
-0.0195***
-0.0116**
-0.0112**
-0.0019
-0.0041
(0.0069)
(0.0059)
(0.0052)
(0.0144)
(0.0103)
FED OG
0.0003
0.0139
0.0055
0.0319
0.0100
(0.0099)
(0.0105)
(0.0085)
(0.0220)
(0.0145)
STATE ALL
0.0072
-0.0186
-0.0149
-0.0494
-0.0364
(0.0409)
(0.0286)
(0.0271)
(0.0425)
(0.0360)
*
STATE OG
0.0362
0.0415
0.0460
0.0408
0.0451
(0.0376)
(0.0307)
(0.0276)
(0.0693)
(0.0503)
OG PCT
0.0005
0.0005
0.0010
0.0010
0.0018
(0.0058)
(0.0052)
(0.0044)
(0.0113)
(0.0077)
***
BARTIK
1.9451
0.5148
0.5008
-0.2177
-0.5628
(0.7512)
(0.4496)
(0.5466)
(0.6448)
(0.8124)
COLLEGE
0.2202***
0.1330***
0.0853***
-0.0002
-0.0334
(0.0459)
(0.0315)
(0.0275)
(0.0260)
(0.0205)
OLD
-0.0119
-0.0044
0.0019
-0.0121
0.0021
(0.0437)
(0.0299)
(0.0262)
(0.0378)
(0.0310)
F statistic:
3.522***
1.49
1.13
2.017*
2.896***
State FEs
F statistic:
Equivalence of
2.55
0.54
2.66
0.41
0.01
federal and state oil
and gas effects
Observations
250
250
250
250
250
2
Adjusted R
0.3380
0.2209
0.1970
0.0444
0.1011
F Statistic
8.9454***
5.4127***
4.8183***
1.7232**
2.7507***
(df = 16; 233)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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DISCUSSION

The results indicate that oil and gas abundance is associated with higher wage levels and
faster wage growth in the counties of the Intermountain West. These findings are similar to other
studies that have measured oil and gas abundance exogenously, notably Michaels’ (2010) study
of oil abundance on the counties of the southern United States and Weber’s (2012) study of the
recent natural gas boom on the counties of Colorado, Wyoming, and Texas. In each case these
authors found that resource abundance had positive effects on local incomes. The regional scale
results reported here are also consistent with Alexeev and Conrad’s (2009) use of level
regressions in a cross-country study which found significant positive effects of exogenously
measured resource abundance on income levels.
The results are strikingly consistent with respect to the positive level and growth effects
of overall resource abundance on county wages, and provide support for Boyce and Emery’s
(2011) hypothesis that resource production without market failures or poor institutions should
result in increased incomes. Given that resource prices and production were generally increasing
(Fig. 1) in the periods analyzed, the results showing a strong positive effect of resource
abundance on growth rates also provide support for Boyce and Emery’s hypothesis regarding the
expected relative growth rates of resource and non-resource sectors. The divergent institutional
ownership effects found in the level and growth regressions can be usefully framed by another
observation from Boyce and Emery: that the positive income effects of resources are a function of
resource production. Because oil and gas production is likely sensitive to costs associated with
the institutional permitting process and the royalty interest charged by mineral owners, these two
concerns frame the discussion below of the divergent institutional effects reported between
federal and state oil and gas ownership variables.
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The federal and state permitting process for oil and gas drilling differ substantially. The
BLM oversees permitting for all federal lands and recent studies of the permitting process at the
BLM reveal long wait times, understaffing, and a lack of oversight and accountability (U.S.
Department of the Interior Office of the Inspector General, 2014; Humphries, 2015). These
indicators of bureaucratic inefficiency are reminiscent of the institutional quality index used by
Mehlum (2006a), which included, among other metrics, an index of bureaucratic quality. The
permitting process to drill for oil and gas on state lands is significantly faster. A 2014 report by
the U.S. Department of the Interior Office of the Inspector General found that state governments
claim an average of 80 days to process and approve an ‘application for permit to drill’ (APD),
whereas the BLM reported an average of 228 days, or 7.5 months, to process an APD on federal
lands. This BLM processing time was an improvement from the average 307 day processing time
in 2011 (Humphries, 2015). While the BLM approves 99 percent of all APDs received, only 6
percent are processed within 30 days; the lack of accountability and oversight results in a process
that “is essentially open ended” (U.S. Department of the Interior Office of the Inspector General,
2014). The uncertainty regarding permitting times and costs is a disincentive for oil and gas
companies to drill on federal lands. One reason for the streamlined permitting process on state
lands is that states are not required to perform the often lengthy environmental review process
demanded by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which only applies to proposed
actions on federal lands and accounts for most of the APD processing time at the BLM (U.S.
Department of the Interior Office of the Inspector General, 2014).
The royalty rates for drilling on state versus federal land are also significantly different.
From a producer’s perspective, a 12.5% royalty rate for drilling on federal land is more attractive
than the 16.67% (the rate in Utah, Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming) or 18.75% (New Mexico)
rates for drilling on state lands. The results suggest that production decisions are likely more
sensitive to the differences in the permitting process than they are to differences in royalty rates
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between federal and state lands. However, the final destination of royalty payments does have an
impact on the local outcomes of resource development. After royalties are collected on federal
lands, 50% is returned to the state of origin, 40% goes to the Bureau of Reclamation, and 10%
goes to the U.S. Treasury (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2013). The state has some discretion
over their share of federal royalties and often invests in roads and other public works in the
communities where oil and gas extraction took place. In return for drilling on federal lands, then,
local communities would benefit from royalties equal to or less than half of 12.5% of the value of
production. When oil and gas is extracted from state lands, in contrast, royalty rates are higher (at
least 16.67% in the study area) and the federal government does not take a 50% share, resulting in
significantly increased royalties retained by the state.
Deeper institutional characteristics also help explain the differing permitting processes
and royalty rates at the federal and state levels. First, state agencies are part of a bureaucracy
whose decision makers are accountable to local and state constituencies to a far greater degree
than are federal agencies, who are accountable to federal overseers in Washington D.C. Second,
state governments are contractually bound to maximize revenue from state trust lands (Souder
and Fairfax, 1996) while federal agencies are constrained by their multiple use mandate. Finally,
state governments arguably have a greater urgency to generate revenue from oil and gas resources
since states have to balance their budgets every year, while the federal government does not.
One would presume that the final institutional variable, private ownership of oil and gas
resources, would be associated with higher production levels, so its insignificant relationship with
local wages is something of a surprise. A simple explanation for the lack of effect of private
ownership is that oil and gas royalties from these lands are not being reinvested in local
communities. Two recent studies suggest the plausibility of this explanation and indicate the
relatively large scale of private versus federal or state oil and gas development. Fitzgerald (2014)
analyzed a substantial collection of mineral leases in the five major oil and gas producing states in
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the study area. He matched the reported address of the grantors of drilling leases, that is, the
mineral owners, to lease locations and created summaries of the proportion of ownership
addresses that were within the same county and the same state as the lease. To estimate the
proportion of total oil and gas revenue that came from private lands, Fitzgerald and Rucker
(2014) collected data on aggregate, federal, and state oil and gas production, and estimated the
quantity of private production as the residual amount after accounting for federal and state
production.
The results of these studies, shown in Table 12, clearly show that only a small minority of
mineral owners live in the same county as the oil or gas lease locations; frequently they live in
another state. Moreover, the proportion of total oil and gas revenue from private lands is very
substantial. While information on private royalty rates is generally unavailable, the state of
Montana does publish private royalty rate information. Fitzgerald and Rucker (2014) report that
for the five year period 2008-2012 royalties for oil and gas production on private lands in that
state averaged 13.5% for oil and 11.8% for gas. These rates are similar to the federal rate of
12.5% and provide a reasonable estimate of private royalty rates. Given the large share of overall
production from private lands and a royalty rate comparable to the federal rate, the effect of
private land ownership on county incomes may be significant if the royalties flowed back to the
local communities. However, the results in Table 12 indicate that royalties from oil and gas
production on private lands are likely flowing to locations remote from the county where the
resource production takes place. In such a scenario one would not expect to see large positive
effects of private land ownership on local wages. Even if private royalties stayed in the county
where production took place, if they concentrate in only a few hands and are not spent or invested
locally it is unlikely that a positive county-level effect on wages would result. In contrast,
resource revenues that accrue to a responsible governmental body would likely have broader
positive effects by increasing public services and investment and/or lowering tax rates (Weber
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2012). This is a reason why some states are considering raising their severance, or production,
taxes on private oil and gas production: to divert more of the resource rents to the communities
located where the resources are extracted (Fitzgerald and Rucker, 2014).

Table 12. Absentee ownership of substantial private oil and gas revenues in the major oil and
gas producing states of the region. The addresses of grantors of private oil and gas leases are
often remote from the county or state of lease locations.
Private owner addressa
Private oil and gas
revenue share (%)b
In-state
In-county
Colorado
61.17
34.52
81.2
Montana
47.73
25.16
78.9
New Mexico
36.51
18.96
29.5
Utah
64.1
12.39
49.7
Wyoming
41.35
29.35
30.0
a
Source: Fitzgerald (2014)
b
Source: Fitzgerald and Rucker (2014).

The empirical results allow an assessment of the potential effects of a transfer of federal
lands to the states, such as has been called for by several state legislatures in the region. The level
effects estimated for the STATE OG and FED OG variables imply that a transfer of federally
owned oil and gas land to the states would contribute to significantly higher county wage levels.
Using the results of the 2010 level regression in Table 7, the implications of such a transfer are
presented in Table 13. Two land transfer levels are considered: one percent of county land, and
five percent of county land. The assumption in each case is that the land in question overlays an
oil and gas basin. Effects are estimated for the top 20 counties by oil and gas production in 2010
measured in BTUs (Low et al., 2014), with at least 5% federal oil and gas land. On average,
transfers of one and five percent of county land imply annual wage level increases of $150 and
$766, respectively. The amount of land at issue in such scenarios is a function of county land
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area; for the twenty counties 1% and 5% land transfers would consist of, on average, 31,700 and
158,500 acres.

Table 13. Wage level effects of a transfer of federal oil and gas lands to state ownership. Two
hypothetical transfer amounts are considered: 1% of county land, and 5% of county land.

Pre – transfer levels

FED OG transfer
effect: 1% of
county land

FED OG transfer
effect: 5% of
county land

Wage
OG
Wage
Wage
level
FED STATE PCT
Acres effect
Acres effect
County
($) OG (%) OG (%) (%) (1000s)
($) (1000s)
($)
Lea, NM
15772
15.2
34.1 100
28.1
184
140.6
942
Eddy, NM
19152
57.1
19.1 100
26.8
156
133.8
797
Duchesne, UT
14473
25.8
7.7
81
20.8
124
103.8
637
Campbell, WY
29089
13.4
6.8 100
30.8
203
153.8
1040
Sublette, WY
26751
50.2
3 69.7
31.3
197
156.6
1006
Sweetwater, WY 24331
67
3.9 99.9
66.9
204
334.3
1042
Park, WY
15003
9.3
1.8 25.3
44.4
151
222.1
774
Uintah, UT
15354
49.2
8.7
89
28.7
136
143.4
697
Fallon, MT
20870
11.2
7 100
10.4
105
51.9
539
Fremont, WY
13237
15.4
2.4 31.1
58.9
156
294.4
796
San Juan, UT
8115
45
4.5
77
50.3
125
251.4
640
Hot Springs, WY 12436
25
2.5
37
12.8
126
64.2
643
Sevier, UT
10228
27.9
1.5 33.6
12.2
103
61.2
529
Garfield, CO
15928
37.8
0.9 73.9
18.9
142
94.4
725
Converse, WY
15558
14.1
10 97.2
27.3
178
136.4
909
Chaves, NM
8991
15.1
10.2 52.1
38.9
122
194.4
623
Big Horn, WY
11372
30.2
1.7
44
20.1
143
100.5
733
Carbon, WY
15101
23.4
4.1 45.3
50.6
161
253
823
Crook, WY
10215
15.1
7.1 100
18.3
169
91.3
867
Rio Arriba, NM
7053
16.5
1.6 42.4
37.5
107
187.7
548
Average
15451
28.2
6.9 69.9
31.7
150
158.5
766
Note: Results shown for 2010 salary and wage levels for the top 20 counties by oil and gas
production in 2010 measured in BTUs (Low et al., 2014), with at least 5% federal oil and gas
land, ordered by 2010 BTU production.
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Also notable is that the mean wage level for these top oil and gas producing counties is
higher than the average for all counties in the study area ($15,451 vs $12,066), and that only six
of the top producing counties have a below-average wage level. Moreover, the single county with
the highest STATE OG value (34.1), Lea County, New Mexico, and the county with the third
highest STATE OG value (19.1), Eddy County, New Mexico, are the top two oil and gas
producers of the sample of 250 counties in each year from 2000-2010 with the exception of 2006
(Low et al., 2014). This anecdotal evidence provides additional support for the level regression
results.
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CONCLUSION

Oil and gas abundance in the counties of the Intermountain West has had a consistently
positive effect on county wage levels and growth rates. Moreover, state ownership of oil and gas
lands has had significantly larger positive effects on local wages than federal ownership. The
discrepancy in effects between the institutional land ownership types is likely attributable to
significant differences in permitting processes, royalty rates, and institutional mandates and
constituencies. Private ownership, meanwhile, has no significant positive effect on local wages,
likely due to extensive absentee ownership.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to systematically assess the ownership
effects of oil and gas resources on economic outcomes at a county level. There are several
possible areas for improvement. First, the analysis assumes that surface land ownership implies
subsurface ownership of minerals including oil and gas. This assumption does not hold in a “split
estate” context, when subsurface minerals are owned by a party other than the surface owner.
While this concern is legitimate I do not have the data to account for it in the empirical models.
Even with such data, the findings may be little changed since the permitting and environmental
review processes would presumably still be strongly influenced by surface ownership. Second,
spatial effects could be incorporated in the models. This would help account for labor and income
effects of oil and gas abundance that cross county lines, for example by oil and gas operations
attracting workers from neighboring counties. Third, additional covariates that leverage
geospatial datasets could be used to develop reasonable measures of the accessibility and
topographic suitability of oil and gas lands. Additionally, this research did not consider nonmarket values of oil and gas lands or the distribution of wage benefits across the income
spectrum.
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Given the strongly positive results of state ownership of oil and gas resources on local
economic outcomes, the findings presented here suggest that research exploring the effects of
governmental scale – that is, assessing whether ‘Small is Beautiful’ (Schumacher, 1971) when it
comes to governmental organization – may be fruitful. Finally, this analysis lends a modicum of
empirical support to the proposals of the state legislatures of the western states calling for the
transfer of federal lands to the states. However, the present analysis addresses only one small
aspect of that charged political debate, which raises broad concerns not only about economic
issues but also about public land access and use, environmental protection, and the role of
government.
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